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bound to ignore the tax-avoidance aspects of outright gifts of income-producing
property to family members. But this does not mean that all other intra-family
tax avoidance schemes should be treated with kid gloves. Whenever possible,
the courts should prevent inroads on the ability-to-pay principle of the revenue
code. By accepting the Tax Court's rationale in the Skemp and Brown
cases, they will be able to suppress the gift and leaseback's vast tax-avoidance
potential. 33
FIRING EMPLOYEES FOR INNOCENT MISSTATEMENTS
AT UNION MEETINGS'*
For a union to operate effectively, its members must be able to discuss
union affairs free from employer restraints. Recognizing this fact, both the
NLRB and the seventh circuit have classified innocent employee misstatements
on union-management relations as concerted union activity protected by the
Labor Management Relations Act." They have held that the discharge of an
33. The simple leaseback principle has also played a major role in modern corporate
financing. By selling business property to tax-exempt institutions and immediately leas-
ing the property back, corporations interested in borrowing funds have been able to
achieve considerable financial advantage, and in no small way reduce their income taxes.
For leaseback rentals are calculated to amortize the sales price-the "loan"-as well as
to pay an amount slightly above the current interest rate. The rentals are deducted under
§ 23(a). Had the corporation borrowed the money, it would only be able to deduct interest
payments, not repayment of the principal. See Cary, Corporate Financing Through Tile
Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 17 (1948); Note, 98 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 696, 698 (1950). See also Armston v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 539 (1949), for realistic judicial treatment of this device.
Title III of the Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., restricts
somewhat the use of the sale and leaseback. Sections 421-424 provide for taxing the here-
tofore tax-exempt institution on the rentals of a lease for more than five years when tie
institution has incurred an indebtedness connected with acquiring or improving the prop-
erty to be leased. The amount of rent included in the gross income of the institution is re-
stricted to the same proportion of the rents as the borrowed funds used to finance the pur-
chase or improvement of the income-producing property bear to the adjusted basis of
such property. Apparently the act does not strike at leasebacks where the tax-exempt
institution has sufficient funds to finance the purchase of the property without borrowing.
* NLRB v. Atlantic Towing Co., 180 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1950).
1. LABOR MANAGEMENT Rm .rioNs Aci, 1947, 61 STAT. 136, 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
157, 158 (Supp. 1948) [hereinafter cited as LMRA]. The pertinent sections are the
following:
"Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities. ...
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employee for making such misstatements is an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a) (1) or 8(a) (3) .2 A recent fifth circuit decision, however,
threatens to check effective union discussion by permitting employer sanctions
on unintentionally false union speech.
In NLRB v. Atlantic Towing Co.,3 an employee was fired for making a false
report at an AFL meeting. He had claimed that the company manager urged
a CIO representative to beat the AFL in organizing the company's workers.
In the ensuing unfair labor practice hearing, the Board found that the employee's
misstatement was not intentional and that his discharge was therefore a viola-
tion of 8(a) (3).5 But the fifth circuit reversed, noting that the employee's
"Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
"(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7; ...
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion: ... !,
2. NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 1946); Westinghouse
Electric Corp. & United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (C.I.O.), 77
N.L.R.B. 1058 (1948).
The Illihois Tool case held that the discharge of an editor of a union bulletin for not
printing a retraction of an inaccurate comparison of company wage rates with those of
nearby plants was a violation of section 8(a) (1). In that case the court found that at the
time the bulletin was printed, the editor was "unaware of the existence of any inaccuracy."
In the Westinghouse case, the Board held that the discharge of an employee who had
made untrue statements to his fellow employees that wage rates were higher at another
plant of the company was a violation of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3). In its opinion the
Board stated: "For all the record shows, [the employee] did not carefully investigate the
facts before asserting that the wage rates were higher at Lima, but neither did he make
those inaccurate statements with any malice or deliberate intention to falsify."
3. 180 F2d 726 (5th Cir. 1950).
4. The facts brought out in the NLRB hearing were these: the CIO agent telephoned
the manager for permission to talk to the company's workers. Thereupon the manager
called the docks to announce the agent's arrival and ordered that the agent be "accorded
every courtesy." The employee overheard the telephone conversation, and when be went
down to the docks, learned that the CIO agent had just left. The Board felt that the
instruction that the CIO agent be accorded every courtesy and the speed ith which the
CIO's organizational attempt followed the conversation, "may well have served to confuse
the thoughts of [the employee] as to what was said, what was intended, and what was
done... ." Atlantic Towing Company and Seafarers International Union, AFL, 75
N.L.R.B. 1169, 1171 (1948).
5. Id. at 1176. Member Gray dissented from the Board's opinion. He felt that
employees are protected from employer discrimination in their discussions of organizational
matters, but that such protection does not extend to statements made, as in this case, at
an open meeting attended by management representatives.
6. NLRB v. Atlantic Towing Co., 180 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1950). Originally the
Fifth Circuit unanimously sustained the Board's reinstatement order, saying: "The Board
found that he [the employee] made a bona fide statement of his recollection of the con-
versation; and we are bound to enforce the order, since on the whole record there is
substantial evidence to support this finding, even though we, or some other fact-finding
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false report implied that the employer had violated the labor law.1 Such a false
statement, it held, was a proper ground for dismissal even if the speaker honestly
believed what he said.8
By permitting discharges for honest misstatements, the Atlantic Towing
rule jeopardizes union activity protected by the LMRA. To increase their
bargaining power by acting in concert, union members must be free to voice
their grievances and to plan joint action in support of one another. Limited
in their access to accurate informatiqn as to the company's policies, they must
often act on unverified suspicions and inferences. 9 If the Atlantic Towing rule
is applied to any false statements about the employer, fear of discharge for
accidentally erroneous statements regarding employer-union relations may
seriously curb legitimate discussion vital to union activities. And even if the
Atlantic Towing rule is limited to statements which imply an employer viola-
tion of law, desirable union speech might still be curtailed. Members of unions
must be free to discuss employer violations in order to enforce rights guaranteed
to them by the Act. Moreover, in an area so honeycombed with regulations, a
tribunal, might fairly and reasonably have found the contrary." NLRB v. Atlantic Tow-
ing Co., 179 F.2d 497, 499 (5th Cir. 1950).
On petition for rehearing, however, the court in a per curiam opinion, Chief Justice
Hutheson dissenting, reversed the Board's decision and denied its petition for enforcement.
NLRB v. Atlantic Towing Co., 180 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1950).
7. NLRB v. Atlantic Towing Co., 180 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1950). The violation im-
plied by the employee's report probably involved section 8(a) (2) of the LMRA which
provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice ... to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it: .... "
The decision does not indicate why the court attached significance to the fact that
the employee's report implied a violation of the Act. In view of section 8(a) (4), dis-
cussed p. 1539 infra, this fact would seemingly strengthen the employee's case.
8. "The statement falsely charged the company with a violation of the labor law.
Respondent had the right to discharge Hendrix for making the statement, irrespective of
whether Hendrix knew or did not know that the statement was false. It was not an unfair
labor practice to discharge him for making it." Ibid.
9. There is often no way union members can ascertain what the employer's policies
actually are. In small concerns such policies are usually made by one man, seldom
recorded, and subject to change without notice. And although unions in larger corpora-
tions may have better trained leadership, here too, in order to gain advantages in bargain-
ing with the union, corporation management will often keep policies secret. Thus both
of the parties must frequently act upon guesses as to what the other's policy is.
See the Board's statement in the Atlantic Towing case: ". . . [Tiruth is not always
apparent, and men are influenced in their conduct by rumors, by inferences from known
facts, and even by mere suspicions which may ultimately prove to be unfounded but which
the exigencies of the situation do not permit of verification; it would, therefore, be de-
cidedly unrealistic to hold that the organizational and concerted activities envisaged by
the Act exclude the utterance by employees of honestly believed statements of fact or
opinion, which, in some cases, may actually be unfounded in fact." Atlantic Towing Com-
pany and Seafarers International Union, AFL, 75 N.L.R.B. 1169, 1172 (1948).
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good many penetrating statements about labor-management relations could
hardly avoid implying a violation of law.10
The Atlantic Towing rule contains another threat to free union activity. It
provides a particularly effective cloak for discriminatory discharge of aggres-
sive union members. Employers who have sought to use other types of conduct
to disguise anti-union discrimination have frequently failed because of proof
that employees less aggressive on behalf of the union were not similarly dis-
ciplined for similar conduct." But nearly all recorded examples of employee
misstatements are contained in union speech only. Since the NLRB vill be
unable to compare the employer's reaction to non-union misstatements with
his attitude towards union misstatements, it will have a difficult time proving
that the misstatement was merely a pretext for discrimination.
The Atlantic Towing decision also seems questionable in view of Section
8(a) (4) of the LIRA. This provision forbids discrimination against an
employee because he has filed unfair labor practice charges or testified before
the NLRB-even though his statements were completely unfounded.'- It
was enacted to prevent employer retaliation which would make employees
afraid to bring grievances before the Board.' 3 But union discussion of the
employer's practices should-and generally does-precede the filing of formal
charges against him with the NLRB. Thus, by allowing an employer to dis-
charge his employees for statements normally made before the union seeks the
help of the Board, the Atlantic Towing rule may permit him to accomplish the
very thing section 8 (a) (4) was designed to prevent.
In addition, administration of the Atlantic Towing rule will involve the
Board in complex problems of fact finding. Since, if the employee's statements
were true, his discharge would be unfair labor practice, the Board will be
10. Frequently union meetings discuss such questions as whether the employer favors
one union over another, promotes non-union men rather than union men, gives union men
less desirable assignments than non-union men, or does not show good faith in collective
bargaining. Any allegation that the employer followed such practices would imply a
violation of the LARA.
11. E.g. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F2d e6 (3rd Cir. 1943), cecr.
tenied 321 U.S. 778 (1944) ; American Mfg. Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 443 (1938); Bradford Dyeing
Association, 4 N.L.R.B. 604 (1937).
In cases of alleged anti-union discrimination, the NLRB must decide whether the
reasons given by the employer for his actions against the union member are his real reasons
or only a prete\-t to weaken the union. The NLRB makes this determination by comparing
the employer's policy in the case before it with his past policies. If the employer is
applying stricter rules in the present case than he has in similiar cases in the past, this
double standard will be taken as evidence of anti-union discrimination. See generally
14 N.L.R.B. Amz. REP., 59-69 (1949) ; GaEaotry & KATZ, LAroR LAW: CASES MAMMLS
AND Cowmrulers, 628-632 (1948).
12. Burnside Steel Foundry Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 128 (1946); Kramer Co., ct al., 29
N.L.R.B. 921, 935 (1941) ; Poe Mfg. Co., 27 N.L.RB. 1257 (1940).
13. SEx. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935). See also 1 CCH Lab. Law
Rep. 2240 (1950).
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forced to determine the truth of a wide variety of statements. In many areas
there is no precise truth ;14 in other areas the truth may lie between the claims
of the parties. Thus the Board will be forced to decide the difficult question
whether the employee's statements were close enough to the truth to be pro-
tected.
Moreover, the Atlantic Toing rule is not really necessary to protect the
employer. Discharge of an employee for his statements will hardly convince
anyone that they were untrue. The employer's guaranteed rights of free
speech' 5 better enable him to counteract false statements.'0
The sounder policy, then, seems to be that pursued by the seventh circuit
and the NLRB.17 The discharge of a speaker for Union speech, however un-
true, should be regarded as an unfair labor practice so long as the speaker did
not have a deliberate intention to falsify. Once the Board is satisfied that a
misstatement was made in the course of union or other concerted activity, the
burden of proving such deliberate intention should lie on the employer. Only
in this way can the free interchange of ideas basic to a sound labor movement
be protected.
14. See, e.g. Bettcher Manufacturing Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 526 (1948). When the em-
ployer, at a union meeting, offered to show his books in order to prove his inability to
raise wages, an employee retorted that the books could easily be juggled. The employer
fired the employee on the grounds that the employee had in effect called him a "crook and
a liar." Without deciding that such was the implication of the employee's statement, tile
NLRB decided that the statement was privileged as concerted activity. It thus avoided
entering the controversial realms of accounting to determine who was speaking the truth.
15. The employer's right of free speech to employees was first established in NLRB
v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). As long as the employer does
not coerce or bribe the employee in the excercise of rights protected by § 7, the employer
"... may descend to vilification, false statement or exaggeration and still be protected in
his right of free speech." NLRB v. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556, 566 (8th ,Cir. 1944).
On employer free speech under both the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor
Management Relations Act, see generally, 2 TELLER, LABOR DIsPuTES AND CouLcrtvE
BARGAINING § 252 (free speech), § 286 (anti-union propaganda) (1940, Supps, 1947,
1950) ; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Managcment Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARy. L.
RLv. 1, 274 (1948) ; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 165 (1948).
16. Traditionally, the antidote for a misuse of free speech has been more free speech,
not attacks upon the speaker. In the present case, the employer exercised his right of free
speech to counteract what he felt were misrepresentations of fact about management.
After firing the employee, the manager called a meeting of the employees and assured them
that both he and the company recognized their right to join any union they wished and
promised that the company would deal with the union of their choice. See testimony of
Frank Spenser, Brief for Petitioner, Appendix, NLRB v. Atlantic Towing Company, 180
F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1950).
17. See note 2 supra.
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